To
understand why segments of the Iranian opposition have not fully broken with
the Islamic regime of Iran, one must return to the roots of the 1979
Revolution. And to grasp the trajectory of that revolution - and its outcome,
which culminated in the Islamic regime - we need to revisit its political and
historical foundations. Dominant narratives tend to focus on a range of social
and cultural factors, but without recognizing a central, unifying thread, the
picture remains incomplete. That thread is the 1953 CIA backed coup d’état. An
event that not only overthrew a government but also shaped the mindset and
orientation of large segments of the opposition for decades. It is this mindset
that today has led many of those same forces toward implicit - and at times
explicit - support for the Islamic Regime.
The
1953 Coup and the Formation of an Opposition Mindset
The
coup of August 19, 1953, was a turning point in which the United States and
Britain, relying on domestic actors, toppled a government that had emerged with
popular support. This was not merely a shift in political power; it became a
defining historical experience that firmly embedded the concept of a
"puppet regime" in the consciousness of opposition forces. From that
point on, many political currents - whether leftist, nationalist, or religious
- analyzed Iran through a shared mental framework: one in which power relations
in Iran could not be understood without accounting for the role of the West, particularly the United States.
Over
time, this experience evolved into a kind of analytical lens. Every political
development, every economic policy, and even many cultural changes were
interpreted in relation to that event. In such a context, anti-Western - and
more specifically anti-American - sentiment became not merely a political
position, but a core component of opposition identity. Even the deep
ideological divisions among these forces could not erase this fundamental
common ground.
In
the years that followed, phenomena such as poverty, class inequality,
censorship, political repression by SAVAK, and even cultural movements like the
Goethe Institute poetry nights, as well as protests by marginalized
populations, were all seen as signs of growing discontent and preludes to
social upheaval. Yet these were more sparks than root causes. The primary driving
force was the sense of historical humiliation stemming from the coup and the
enduring effort to redress it. This sentiment was not merely emotional; it
became a political and strategic question. The central concern for opposition
forces - both seasoned actors and newly emerging groups - was how to avenge
that historical defeat and prevent its recurrence.
Within
this framework, even top-down reforms were viewed with suspicion. The Pahlavi
state, at various points, attempted to contain discontent through economic
modernization and limited social reforms. However, because these measures
failed to address the central issue - political independence and the role of
foreign powers - they could not bridge the gap between the state and the
opposition. The coup became an open wound in the political memory of society; a
wound that state actions often reopened rather than healed.
Thus,
the opposition was shaped not only in reaction to immediate conditions, but in
the shadow of a shared historical experience - one that served both as a source
of legitimacy for struggle and as a guide to its direction. Understanding this
is essential to making sense of subsequent developments, including the
emergence of revolutionary discourse in the 1970s.
From
Opposition to the West to Ideological Rule
It
was within this context that the 1979 Revolution took shape. The revolution was
not merely the product of domestic economic or political grievances; it must
also be understood as part of a broader wave of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist
movements across the globe. From Asia to Africa to Latin America, a dominant
discourse had emerged in the mid-20th century that defined
"independence" in opposition to the West - particularly the United
States - often with the backing of the Soviet Union as a major geopolitical and
economic pole. In Iran, this discourse merged with the experience of the 1953
coup and became a powerful force of political mobilization.
At
the level of slogans, the revolution was pluralistic, encompassing demands ranging
from political freedom to social justice and economic welfare. Yet beneath this
diversity lay a common axis: opposition to the United States and to what was
perceived as an imposed global order. This shared axis enabled heterogeneous
forces to unite and gave coherence to the revolutionary movement.
Power
ultimately fell into the hands of Khomeini. At various stages, and through the
use of religious dissimulation (taqiyya),
he spoke of freedom, justice, and even welfare. But his fundamental orientation
rested from the outset on an ideological confrontation. In his view, the issue
was not simply the replacement of one government, but resistance to a
"corrupt" and "dominating" global order. The focus on
confrontation with the United States and Israel, efforts to export the Islamic
Revolution, and the construction of a political system grounded in Islamic
ideology were present from the beginning. Over time, these orientations shaped
not only foreign policy, but also the internal structure of the regime.
The
seizure of the U.S. embassy and the subsequent hostage crisis was one of the
earliest concrete manifestations of this approach - an event that demonstrated
that confrontation with the United States was not a temporary tactic, but a
core element of the new regime's identity. This trajectory gradually solidified
and became the backbone of the Islamic regime’s politics. Many of the forces
involved in the revolution - from leftist groups to religious and nationalist
actors - despite their differences in ultimate goals and political programs,
found common ground in this shared hostility. This convergence created a
political environment in which the most radical and uncompromising stance in
this confrontation gained the upper hand. In such a climate, Khomeini’s line
succeeded in establishing itself as the dominant narrative.
Thus,
opposition to the West evolved from an important component of politics into its
central axis. This axis not only marginalized rivals, but also constrained the
articulation and consolidation of alternative visions, such as liberal
democracy or independent socialism. The result was a system that defined its
identity above all in relation to an external enemy - an orientation that
became decisive both in foreign policy and in the structuring of internal
relations.
The
Persistence of a Mindset in Contemporary Politics
Over
time, large segments of Iranian society distanced themselves from this
discourse, having witnessed how it undermined their lives. The lived experience
of the Islamic regime has shown that hostility toward the United States and
Israel has led neither to genuine independence nor to prosperity and freedom.
Yet this mindset has persisted among certain political forces.
Even
today, one can observe this continuity. Some political currents, both inside
and outside Iran, continue to center their analysis on U.S. foreign policy. For
these forces, opposition to the United States has become the primary priority.
Within such a framework, the behavior of the Islamic regime toward the Iranian
people is pushed to the margins.
The
result is a form of sympathy - or, at the very least, silence - in the face of
domestic repression. Mass killings are attributed to Mossad or to American
conspiracies, as if the principal contradiction were not between the people and
the state, but between the state and external powers. This inversion can be
traced directly back to the historical experience of the 1953 coup and its
enduring consequences.
The
roots of the near-existential defense of the Islamic regime by some opposition
forces must be sought in the original and central objective of the 1979
Revolution. That revolution cannot be explained solely by reference to social
grievances - important as they were. It was the product of a particular
political mindset, formed in the context of the 1953 coup and sustained through
anti-Westernism. This same mindset shaped the course of the revolution and
ultimately led to the establishment of the Islamic regime. Without a critical
reassessment of this intellectual foundation, it is impossible to prevent the
repetition of the same errors. This is not merely a matter of the past; it
remains a living issue in contemporary politics.
March 19, 2026
