۱۴۰۴ اسفند ۲۸, پنجشنبه

From Anti-Imperialism to Sympathy with Authoritarianism

To understand why segments of the Iranian opposition have not fully broken with the Islamic regime of Iran, one must return to the roots of the 1979 Revolution. And to grasp the trajectory of that revolution - and its outcome, which culminated in the Islamic regime - we need to revisit its political and historical foundations. Dominant narratives tend to focus on a range of social and cultural factors, but without recognizing a central, unifying thread, the picture remains incomplete. That thread is the 1953 CIA backed coup d’état. An event that not only overthrew a government but also shaped the mindset and orientation of large segments of the opposition for decades. It is this mindset that today has led many of those same forces toward implicit - and at times explicit - support for the Islamic Regime.

 

The 1953 Coup and the Formation of an Opposition Mindset

 

The coup of August 19, 1953, was a turning point in which the United States and Britain, relying on domestic actors, toppled a government that had emerged with popular support. This was not merely a shift in political power; it became a defining historical experience that firmly embedded the concept of a "puppet regime" in the consciousness of opposition forces. From that point on, many political currents - whether leftist, nationalist, or religious - analyzed Iran through a shared mental framework: one in which power relations in Iran could not be understood without accounting for the role of the West, particularly the United States.

 

Over time, this experience evolved into a kind of analytical lens. Every political development, every economic policy, and even many cultural changes were interpreted in relation to that event. In such a context, anti-Western - and more specifically anti-American - sentiment became not merely a political position, but a core component of opposition identity. Even the deep ideological divisions among these forces could not erase this fundamental common ground.

 

In the years that followed, phenomena such as poverty, class inequality, censorship, political repression by SAVAK, and even cultural movements like the Goethe Institute poetry nights, as well as protests by marginalized populations, were all seen as signs of growing discontent and preludes to social upheaval. Yet these were more sparks than root causes. The primary driving force was the sense of historical humiliation stemming from the coup and the enduring effort to redress it. This sentiment was not merely emotional; it became a political and strategic question. The central concern for opposition forces - both seasoned actors and newly emerging groups - was how to avenge that historical defeat and prevent its recurrence.

 

Within this framework, even top-down reforms were viewed with suspicion. The Pahlavi state, at various points, attempted to contain discontent through economic modernization and limited social reforms. However, because these measures failed to address the central issue - political independence and the role of foreign powers - they could not bridge the gap between the state and the opposition. The coup became an open wound in the political memory of society; a wound that state actions often reopened rather than healed.

 

Thus, the opposition was shaped not only in reaction to immediate conditions, but in the shadow of a shared historical experience - one that served both as a source of legitimacy for struggle and as a guide to its direction. Understanding this is essential to making sense of subsequent developments, including the emergence of revolutionary discourse in the 1970s.

 

From Opposition to the West to Ideological Rule

 

It was within this context that the 1979 Revolution took shape. The revolution was not merely the product of domestic economic or political grievances; it must also be understood as part of a broader wave of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements across the globe. From Asia to Africa to Latin America, a dominant discourse had emerged in the mid-20th century that defined "independence" in opposition to the West - particularly the United States - often with the backing of the Soviet Union as a major geopolitical and economic pole. In Iran, this discourse merged with the experience of the 1953 coup and became a powerful force of political mobilization.

 

At the level of slogans, the revolution was pluralistic, encompassing demands ranging from political freedom to social justice and economic welfare. Yet beneath this diversity lay a common axis: opposition to the United States and to what was perceived as an imposed global order. This shared axis enabled heterogeneous forces to unite and gave coherence to the revolutionary movement.

 

Power ultimately fell into the hands of Khomeini. At various stages, and through the use of religious dissimulation (taqiyya), he spoke of freedom, justice, and even welfare. But his fundamental orientation rested from the outset on an ideological confrontation. In his view, the issue was not simply the replacement of one government, but resistance to a "corrupt" and "dominating" global order. The focus on confrontation with the United States and Israel, efforts to export the Islamic Revolution, and the construction of a political system grounded in Islamic ideology were present from the beginning. Over time, these orientations shaped not only foreign policy, but also the internal structure of the regime.

 

The seizure of the U.S. embassy and the subsequent hostage crisis was one of the earliest concrete manifestations of this approach - an event that demonstrated that confrontation with the United States was not a temporary tactic, but a core element of the new regime's identity. This trajectory gradually solidified and became the backbone of the Islamic regime’s politics. Many of the forces involved in the revolution - from leftist groups to religious and nationalist actors - despite their differences in ultimate goals and political programs, found common ground in this shared hostility. This convergence created a political environment in which the most radical and uncompromising stance in this confrontation gained the upper hand. In such a climate, Khomeini’s line succeeded in establishing itself as the dominant narrative.

 

Thus, opposition to the West evolved from an important component of politics into its central axis. This axis not only marginalized rivals, but also constrained the articulation and consolidation of alternative visions, such as liberal democracy or independent socialism. The result was a system that defined its identity above all in relation to an external enemy - an orientation that became decisive both in foreign policy and in the structuring of internal relations.

 

The Persistence of a Mindset in Contemporary Politics

 

Over time, large segments of Iranian society distanced themselves from this discourse, having witnessed how it undermined their lives. The lived experience of the Islamic regime has shown that hostility toward the United States and Israel has led neither to genuine independence nor to prosperity and freedom. Yet this mindset has persisted among certain political forces.

 


Even today, one can observe this continuity. Some political currents, both inside and outside Iran, continue to center their analysis on U.S. foreign policy. For these forces, opposition to the United States has become the primary priority. Within such a framework, the behavior of the Islamic regime toward the Iranian people is pushed to the margins.

 

The result is a form of sympathy - or, at the very least, silence - in the face of domestic repression. Mass killings are attributed to Mossad or to American conspiracies, as if the principal contradiction were not between the people and the state, but between the state and external powers. This inversion can be traced directly back to the historical experience of the 1953 coup and its enduring consequences.

 

The roots of the near-existential defense of the Islamic regime by some opposition forces must be sought in the original and central objective of the 1979 Revolution. That revolution cannot be explained solely by reference to social grievances - important as they were. It was the product of a particular political mindset, formed in the context of the 1953 coup and sustained through anti-Westernism. This same mindset shaped the course of the revolution and ultimately led to the establishment of the Islamic regime. Without a critical reassessment of this intellectual foundation, it is impossible to prevent the repetition of the same errors. This is not merely a matter of the past; it remains a living issue in contemporary politics.

 

March 19, 2026

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